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Abstract
"The Guaranteed Student Loan Program provides loans to students even without collateral, income, or
credit history, which creates a great risk."
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An Analysis of Guaranteed Student Loans
Amanda Leifheit
In order to finance a college education, a
student may need to borrow money fiom a
bank, credit union, savings and loan, or the
government. The types of loans available to
students include Direct Loans and Federal
Family Education Program Loans. These
loans are subsidized or unsubsidized. In the
Federal Direct Student Loan Program the
govemment financesthe student's education by
lending money through schools, while in the
Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP) the education is financed with the
help of loans fiom banks, credit unions, and
savings and loans (U.S., 1995, p. 25). If the
loan is subsidized, it is given based on financial
need, and the government pays the interest
until the student finishes schooling (U.S.,
1995, p. 27). This way the student is not held
accountable for the interest that accrues on the
loan while he or she is in school. If the loan is
unsubsidiied, it is not given based on need,
and the student has to pay interest fiom its
origination (U.S., 1995, p. 27). The student is
then responsible for paying the interest that
accrues while he or she is attending school.
The FFELP provides many loans including the
subsidized Federal StafTord Loan and the
unsubsidii Federal Stafford Loan which
have an effect on the students and banks
(Federal, 1994). This paper discusses the pros
and cons of the Stafford Loan Program to the
students and the commercial lenders and the
probable effects of the program's termination.
The govenunent has set up the Staf'ford
Loan Program, also known as the Guaranteed
Student Loan Program, which has three main
principles. The first of three main principles is
the default guarantee (Hungerford and
Upshaw, 1994, p. 236). The loan is
guaranteed one hundred percent fiom default
by the federal government if the lender follows

the correct guidelines in servicing the loan
(Hungerford and Upshaw, 1994, p. 236). The
second feature is the special allowance
payment to banks (Hungerford and Upshaw,
1994, p. 236). "[It] introduces a wedge
between the rate received by lenders and that
paid by borrowers" (Hungerford and Upshaw,
1994, p. 236). The federal government
reduces the wedge by paying the commercial
lenders the difference between what the
borrowers pay and the market rate which is set
by "the bond equivalent yield on 91-day
Treasury bills plus an additional interest
supplement legislatively set at 3.1P ?
(Hungerford and Upshaw, 1994, p. 236). The
third feature is secondary market creation for
guaranteed student loans (Hungerford and
Upshaw, 1994, p. 236). For this goal
Congress created the Student Loan Marketing
Association, also known as Sallie Mae. The
goal of this government-sponsored enterprise
was to be an incentive for lenders to make
student loans by allowing these loans to be
sold any time after origination to create more
liquidity for the lender (Hungerford and
Upshaw, 1994, p. 236).
In order to perform its function, Sallie Mae
must have a supply of funding. It does this by
selling debt securities through the Federal
F i c i n g Bank (Woefel, 1994, p. 1097). "In
Sallie Mae's case, it is viewed as a prime credit
for investors and often has traded with the
smallest spread on its borrowings over U.S.
Treasury securities of any of the other
agencies, Ginnie Mae included" (Geisst, 1990,
p. 130). Even though Sallie Mae deals with a
risky purchase, its government guarantee
makes a good investment. The structure of
this secondary market is complex; it begins at
the state level with a student loan agency.
This agency secures the loan to the originator

(Geisst, 1990, p. 127). "The state agency...
then 'reinsures' the loan with Sallie Mae to
protect the lender against default" (Geisst,
1990, p. 127).
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"The Guaranteed Student
Loan Program provides loans
to students even without
collateral, income, or credit
history, which creates a great
risk."
How is the student affected by guaranteed
student loans? A guaranteed loan positively
affects the student borrower. Student loans
make a college education accessible to those
who could otherwise not afford one. Students
have no collateral, credit history, or income
which makes it difIicult to obtain a loan
(Knapp and Seaks, 1992, p. 404). Students do
not own homes, eliminating the mortgage or
home equity options. The Guaranteed Student
Loan Program provides loans to students even
without collateral, income, or credit history,
which creates a great risk. Because the
government guarantees these loans, the risk is
almost eliminated fiom the banks.
Also, the student borrower is given
flexibiity in repayment based on financial
ability. There is usually a grace period of
about six months after the schooling has
terminated in which the student does not begin
to repay the loan. This gives the student some
time to become more financially stable before
the repayment system begins. A student
borrower may also defer repayment of his or
her loan if they meet "certain criteria" (Before,
1994, p. 12). A forbearance is also available
which adjusts payments due to financial ability
during times of financial difficulty (Before,
1994, p. 13). This flexibility helps the student
if he or she decides to go back to school, loses
a job, or is unable to find employment.

In addition, if a student has a loan which
has been purchased by Sallie Mae or any other
private agency, then there are many repayment
options available to him. The SMART loan
program by Sallie Mae allows the borrower to
consolidate all his or her student loans into one
reducing the first few payments and extending
the pay back term (SWRT, 1994). This
means that instead of paying back three loans
at one time, a student can consolidate them
and pay all three off with one, smaller payment
per month for a longer period of time. Sallie
Mae's Select Step Account allows the
borrower to make smaller initial payments
which increase as the borrower's ability to pay
increases (Select, 1994). This helps the
student become more financially stable with
the smaller payments which in turn makes the
borrower more able to pay the larger payments
later. The Great Rewards Program reduces
the bornwets interest rate by two percentage
points if the first forty-eight scheduled StafFord
Loan payments are on time (?bee, 1995). So,
a borrower who is able to make all payments
will not have to pay back as much because the
interest rate will decrease.
However, the guaranteed student loan also
has negative effects on the student borrower.
There is always a chance that the student will
default because the targeted group for student
loans are those who could not afford to pay
for an education. It is obvious that if a student
did not have the money to pay for school
before he or she started college, there is no
guarantee that he or she will be able to pay
back this money after he or she finishes
college. The study done using data fiom the
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study by
Mark Dynarski finds that "default rates were
higher for minorities, high school dropouts or
GED recipients, borrowers at propriety or
two-year schools, borrowers who did not
complete their post secondary program, and
after leaving their
borrowers with low &gs
post secondary institutions" (1994, p. 58).
Another study done by Laura Greene Knapp
and Terry G. Seaks using data from the
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Higher Education Assktance Agency finds that
student graduation reduces default, and
employment with increases in earnings will
also lower default. "However, it is also
plausible that the tenacity and internal
motivations that cause some students to
complete a degree may also be operating to
reduce their default rate" (Knapp and Seaks,
1992, p. 4 10). Characteristics of individuals,
not of institutions, are factors of default like
family status, parents' income, student's
graduation, and race (Knapp and Seaks, 1992,
pp. 408-4 10). Since there are so many factors
that cause default, it is not surprising that so
many students do default on the student loan
payments.
If a student borrower defaults, it affects
more than just his or her credit history
(Before, 1994, p. 12). If a borrower defaults,
the following events may occur:
Holds may be placed on [the borrower's]
college records. [The borrower] may be
ineligible for future financial aid. [The
borrower's] federal income tax refbnds
may be seized. [The borrower's] wages
may be garnished. [The borrower's]
account may be assigned to a guaranty
agency which will continue to collect the
balance due from [him or her]. [The
borrower] may be charged attorney's fees
and other costs of collecting [his or her]
debt ( Befoe, 1994, p. 12).
The effects of the default can detrimentally
affect the student lender for a long time and in

many aspects of his or her life.
How is the commercial lender affected?
Providing guaranteed student loans can be
beneficial to the commercial lender. The
default guarantee protects the bank from the
risk of a student defaulting on his or her loan.
The secondary market for guaranteed student
loans provides liquidity to the bank. The
special allowance payment makes guaranteed
student loans appealing to a bank. If it were

not for this program banks would not lend to
students because students are risky
investments. However, this program does
exist, so loans to students are not as risky to
banks. Student loans do not take away fiom
the bank's liquidity, and they do not make the
bank take a loss when they are repaid because
of the lower interest rate on student loans.
Yet, providing guaranteed loans can also
be detrimental to the commercial lender.
Because of the cost to the government of the
special allowance payment, the commercial
lenders might w o w about the threat of
government taking over lending to students
(Hungerford and Upshaw, 1994, p. 241). If
the government provided loans to students
then the Guaranteed Student Loan Program
would cease to exist. This would make
lending by banks to students very risky.
Therefore, banks would no longer make
students loans causing them to lose this
business. Also, even though the loans are
guaranteed, the time is longer for a student
loan to be declared in default than a nonguaranteed consumer loan which shows the
bank's opportunity cost of lending to students
(Geisst, 1990, p. 127). This would cause the
banks to incur a loss for the time period
between the original d e M t and the repayment
by the government.
What if the government took over by
lending to students directly and terminating the
StaEord Loan Program? There are advantages
in terminating the Stafford Loan Program.
This would eliminate the banks, credit unions,
savings and loans, and state student loan
agencies as intermediaries. This would also
reduce the need for a secondary market for
student loans. This would reduce costs since
there would be no special allowance payments
to banks or payments for defaulted loans.
These losses would be strictly felt by the
government. The government would not need
to keep reserves l i e a bank does for the loan.
This would increase the money in circulation
because there would not be the amount of
money held up in reserves that there is now.
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Also, Sallie Mae has had a decrease in
performance, so a suggestion was to allow it
to branch into other markets ("Sallie," 1995, p.
70). This would allow Sdie Mae to stay in
business even if there is no more need for a
secondary market for student loans.
There are also disadvantages to
terminating the Stafford Loan Program. The
costs would be placed on the schools for the
administrative tasks that banks usually handle
(Foust, 1993, p. 74). This would increase
tuition because there would be a need for more
clerical help, more financial aid administrators,
and more form processing costs. The
government would need to learn to use new
software to service loans as quickly and
efficiently as banks do (Foust, 1993, p. 74).
Banks have devised quick and efficient systems
after years of practice. The government would
be taking on so many loans that it would
require time to develop an efficient way of
processing them. And, Sallie Mae is a
hctioning company that has done well in the
past. In 1993, its costs were down by 21%
and profits were up by 172% since 1986
(Foust, 1993, p. 74). Putting an end to the
secondaxy market for student loans would put
an end to a business with potential. This
secondary market is already up and running;
eliminating it may have an impact on the
economy. If the program is left the way it is,
the reduction in government payment to
lenders by a half a point would save taxpayers
$970 million over five years (Foust, 1993, p.
74). So, just this small change in the special
allowance payment would reduce the cost of
the Guaranteed Student Loan Program.
The StafFord Loan Program is both
beneficial and detrimental to the students and
banks. Having all student loans made directly
from the government also has pros and cons.
So taking all of this into consideration, should
student loans be made directly from the
government, avoiding all the intermediaries
like banks and Sallie Mae? Student loans will
always be risky because the only collateral
available is a promise to repay. Although

banks are reluctant to lend to students during
times where default is expected due to a poor
economy, Sallie Mae is there to provide
liquidity to the bank, and the government is
there to guarantee the loan (Geisst, 1990, p.
133). So, this process takes some of the risk
away from the bank, the state agency, and
Sallie Mae and gives more risk to the
government. If the government lent directly,
it would take on all the risk. With student
loans there is always a high amount of risk in
the economy, and switching to government
direct lending just shifts the risks completely to
the government. When evaluating the amount
of risk involved in each lending practice, one
could not be chosen as better than the other
because of the similar amount of risk involved.
Taking this into consideration, the best idea is
to leave the Stafford Loan Program in place
instead of instigating a new program
composed of all direct student loans.
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The Stock Market as a Leading Indicator:
An Application of Granger Causality
Brad Comincioli

L INTRODUCTION
The stock market has traditionally been
viewed as an indicator or "predictor" of the
economy. Many believe that large decreases in
stock prices are reflective of a hture
recession, whereas large increases in stock
prices suggest future economic growth.
The stock market as an indicator of
economic activity, however, does not go
without controversy. Skeptics point to the
strong economic growth that followed the
1987 stock market crash as reason to doubt
the stock market's predictive ability. Given
the controversy that surrounds the stock
market as an indicator of h r e economic
activity, it seems relevant to further research
this topic.
Theoretical reasons for why stock prices
might predict economic activity include the
traditional valuation model of stock prices and
the "wealth effect." The traditional valuation
model of stock prices suggests that stock
prices reflect expectations about the future
economy, and can therefore predict the
economy. The "wealth effect" contends that
stock prices lead economic activity by actually
causing what happens to the economy.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to
evaluate stock prices as a leading indicator of
economic activity. Time-series analysis and
the notion of "Granger causality" are used in
this project to estimate relationships between
stock prices and the economy, and to see if
they are consistent with theory.
In this paper, we will explore the following
questions. First, does the stock market lead
the real economy, in the sense that variation in
its past values explains some of the variation in
the real economy? Second, does the stock

market "Granger-cause" the real economy, in
which case past values of stock prices improve
the prediction of hture economic activity?
And third, does the real economy "Grangercause" the stock market, in that past values of
economic activity improve the prediction of
the stock market?

11. CAN THE STOCK MARKET
PREDICT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY?
The question of whether the stock market
can predict the economy has been widely
debated. Those who support the market's
predictive abiity argue that the stock market is
forward-looking, and current prices reflect the
future earnings potential, or profitability, of
corporations. Since stock prices reflect
expectations about profitability, and
profitabiity is directly linked to economic
activity, fluctuations in stock prices are
thought to lead the direction of the economy.
If the economy is expected to enter into a
recession, for example, the stock market will
anticipate this by bidding down the prices of
stocks.
The "wealth effect" is also regarded as
support for the stock market's predictive
ability. Pearce (1983) argues that since
fluctuations in stock prices have a diect effect
on aggregate spending, the economy can be
predicted fiom the stock market. When the
stock market is rising, investors are more
wealthy and spend more. As a result, the
economy expands. On the other hand, if stock
prices are declining, investors are less wealthy
and spend less. This results in slower
economic growth.
Critics, however, point to a number of
reasons not to trust the stock market as an

